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I. INTRODUCTION
Multinational corporations are corporate groups typically organized in
traditional hierarchical form with a parent corporation and scores of
subsidiaries collectively conducting the business of the group around the
world.' While most U.S. multinational groups operate through wholly
owned subsidiaries, a minority of U.S. subsidiaries are partly owned.'
However, whether wholly owned or partly owned, the members of the
hierarchical group operate under the control of the parent corporation.3
Control is the underlying element that assures the coordinated integration of
the activities of the group and forges the numerous affiliates into a firm. In
the traditional hierarchical organizational pattern, control is almost never
1. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CoRPoRATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 30-37 (1983) [hereinafter
BLUMBERG: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS]. The development of multinational corporations has
been extensively examined by the author. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A.
STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATE STATUTORY LAW (1995) [hereinafter BLUMBERG & STRASSER:
STATE STATUTORY LAW]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER
STATUTORY LAW SPECIFICALLY APPLYING ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES (1992) [hereinafter
BLUMBERG & STRASSER: SPECIFIC STATUTORY LAW]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER
STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION (1989) [hereinafter BLUMBERG: GENERAL
STATUTORY LAW]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CON-
TRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1987) [hereinafter BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW
PROBLEMS]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE
BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES (1985) [hereinafter BLUMBERG: BANKRUPTCY
PROBLEMS]. (The seventh and concluding volume of the series, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, will appear in 1998.); see
also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993).
2. BLUMBERG: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 30-37; HARVEY S. JAMES, JR.
& MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, WHEN BUSINESSES CROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS: STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES 48 (1993).
3. BLUMBERG: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 30-37.
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shared.4 Shared control is unknown except at the higher level of the
shareholder-investors in the parent corporation, who may influence or
determine the policies of the enterprise but are not an active participant in it.
This traditional pattern of corporate groups organized in hierarchical form
has never been exclusive and increasingly, is being supplemented by other
enterprises organized in nonhierarchical fashion in which control is shared.
Corporations are joining forces and conducting some aspects of their
operations through joint ventures, strategic alliances, and corporate
networks.'
Hierarchical corporate structures are also dominant in European
multinational groups. However, neither the hierarchical form nor the pattern
of wholly owned subsidiaries has been as widely accepted in Europe. Thus,
there are some major European groups with dual parent corporations, such
as Royal Dutch-Shell and Agfa-Gevaert. Partly owned subsidiaries are much
more common than in the United States.6 In addition, strategic alliances and
corporate networks have made an increasing appearance.7 Finally, European
groups linked by interlocking stock ownership in a holding company, in
which control has been shared, have become increasingly important.8 These
are the so-called European holding groups.9  European multinational
structure is evidently more complex than in the United States, but notwith-
standing these departures, European groups, like those in the United States,
are typically hierarchical. Comparable developments in Japan in the form of
the zaibatsu and keiretsu, and more recently the kigyoshodan, are well
known. °
Such changing organizational patterns have introduced a new complexity
4. While two corporate groups may join in a corporate joint venture, the joint venture
will conduct its own business, typically one that exists in an area of tangency between them.
5. JAMES & WEIDENBAUM, supra note 2, at 8-12. Strategic alliances and networks are
essentially licenses or contractual understandings and arrangements on certain dealings
between the parties. In contrast to the cases applying enterprise principles, they do not present
a basis for recognition, at least for the purpose at hand, as having a separate juridical identity
in any context. As will be seen, corporate joint ventures have been the only nonhierarchical
undertakings that have received judicial scrutiny for these purposes. The courts have
uniformly refused to depart from traditional corporate principles in determining the general
legal consequences arising from the corporate joint venture structure.
6. See Klaus J. Hopt, Book Review, 32 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1995)
(reviewing CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE
DYNAMICS OF REGULATION (Joseph McCahery et al. eds., 1993)).
7. JAMES & WEIDENBAUM, supra note 2, at 61.
8. Id. at 97-101.
9. See Cynthia Van Hulle, On the Nature of European Holding Groups,
Onderzoeksrapport Nr 9609 (D/1996/2376/9) (The Netherlands).
10. See JOHN SCOTT, CORPORATE GROUPS AND NETWORK STRUCTURE IN CORPORATE
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 291, 302 (Joseph McCahery et al. eds., 1993); Melissa J.
Krasnow, Corporate Interdependence: The Debt and Equity Financing of Japanese
Companies, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 55, 58 (1993); Hopt, supra note 6, at 1062.
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in those areas of the law in which concepts of control have been recognized.
In these newer organizational forms, no participating multinational corpora-
tion exercises sole control. On the contrary, the essence of the development
is the emergence of a nonhierarchical structure in which control is shared.
This article examines the significance of shared control in U.S. regulatory
and common law. At the outset, it should be recognized that the doctrine of
control has played a central role, and problems involving shared control have
been of peripheral importance at the most. Nevertheless, shared control does
present special problems-that deserve examination.
This article commences with an attempt to delineate the various forms
that the concepts of control and shared control can assume in any given case.
It then examines shared control as a subset of the larger doctrine of control.
After exploring the use of control as the primary legal standard, this article
seeks to ascertain the light, if any, cast by the available materials in the
various contexts involved on the significance of shared control. It concludes
that shared control appears to serve as a basis for liability under enterprise
purposes only in a limited area and that the prospects for change are limited.
II. MEANINGS OF CONTROL AND SHARED CONTROL
A. Levels of Control
In its earliest consideration in common law matters, control commonly
referred to a shareholder's power to control the election of the board of
directors of a corporation." Through the ability to designate a majority of
the board of directors, the shareholder assumed the reins of power over the
business of the corporation. As is well known, such control over the election
of directors need not rest on majority ownership of the voting shares. Where
shares are widely distributed, as in a large corporation, ownership or control
over a significant bloc of shares may provide control where no other holder
or group of holders has a bloc of comparable size; this is sometimes called
"working control."' 2
For statutory purposes, as will be seen, "control" is typically defined in
even more expansive terms not only to include the undisputed power to
direct the management or business of the subsidiary (or controlled)
corporation, but also to have a role of lesser significance in the shaping of
11. See generally BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note I.
12. E.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579-80 (2d Cir. 1962) (28.3.%
of voting stock represents working control); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp.
361, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (23% "power to provide control"); cf 49 U.S.C. § 10102(7) (1994)
(stating that "'control' ... includes actual control, legal control, and the power to exercise
control"); see also Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY
REGULATION 374 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the determinants of control).
[Vol. 10
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corporate decisions. Not only the significance but also the very meaning of
control takes on a different content in different areas of the law.
B. Levels of Shared Control
Shared control may refer to participation in the collective possession or
exercise of the underlying power to elect a majority of the board of directors.
Alternatively, it may refer to power over the management and the policies of
a corporation. Such a broadened use of shared control introduces a wide-
range of varietal forms, from the clear-cut power to command to lesser
degrees of influence.
Thus, at the outset, it is desirable to recognize that the concept of shared
control analytically includes at least six very different levels of the power to
control:
(1) Involvement in a group that by acting in concert has the power
to elect a majority of the board of directors of a corporation; 3
(2) involvement in the management of the subsidiary (or controlled)
corporation, including actual participation in the tort, statutory
violation, or other corporate acts of the subsidiary giving rise to
alleged liability;
(3) involvement in the management of the subsidiary including
participation in day-to-day affairs but not in the subsidiary's acts
giving rise to alleged liability;
(4) general involvement in the management of the subsidiary but not
including day-to-day affairs;
(5) no involvement in the management of the subsidiary, but having
a veto over actions of the parent, including those affecting the
subsidiary and its operations; and
(6) no involvement in the management of the subsidiary, but having
a position disposing the management of the parent to consult it and
to take its views into account in determining actions of the parent
affecting the subsidiary and its operations.
These different interrelationships between the party in question and the
controlled companies represent a continuum of instances of shared control.
These must be examined in light of the role of control in the various areas
of law presented and the circumstances of the particular case.
13. The power to elect a majority of the board members relates solely to the parent
corporation. Other manifestations of shared control relate both to the parent and to the aspects
of its interrelationship with the subsidiary, giving rise to the possible imposition of enterprise
liability on the parent corporation for acts of the subsidiary.
1996]
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Ill. CONTROL AND SHARED CONTROL IN VARIOUS AREAS OF
U.S. LAW APPLYING ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES
A. Introduction
Control plays a crucial role in the application of enterprise principles
wherever they have been adopted in U.S. law. Notwithstanding its central
role, control is not a transcendental jurisprudential concept to be applied
throughout U.S. law irrespective of the particular area under consideration.
On the contrary, control is a doctrine whose significance in the application
of enterprise principles attributing legal rights or imposing legal obligations
on one member of corporate group for the actions of another depends on the
global context (the juridical area of law under consideration, that is statutory
law or common law), the general context (the particular statute or branch of
common law), and the particular context (the particular aspect in issue) in
which it arises. It is a fact-specific relationship to be evaluated pragmatically
in light of all the dimensions of the law in the area. Accordingly, control
(and derivatively shared control) assumes somewhat different meanings and
plays somewhat different roles in these various areas.
As noted, shared control, or the possession or exercise of control by more
than one party, is a subset of the larger concept of control. Accordingly, any
consideration of the significance of shared control for purposes of application
of enterprise principles can only take place within the larger structure of the
role of control in the particular area of U.S. statutory or common law in
question. Further, it is an examination that must be pursued in light of the
general underlying policies and objectives of the area in question and the
specific context in which it is being applied.
Therefore, this review of the legal significance of shared control makes
several interrelated inquiries. The review first examines the different roles
of the concept of control in U.S. law, which may be conveniently divided
into three major areas for analytical purposes. 14  It then reviews the
significance of shared control in each of these three areas. In particular, it
seeks to ascertain which of the varying manifestations of shared participation
in the decisional process of a corporation may give rise to liability in the
areas of U.S. law under consideration.
The best starting point is a review of the evolution of U.S. regulatory
14. The three major areas of control in U.S. law include: (1) statutes of specific
application (i.e., those that make express reference to control, parent, subsidiary, or affiliated
corporations); (2) statutes of general application (i.e., those that regulate certain activities but




law. Until the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, regulatory
law had followed the traditional principles of corporation law. These
principles were grounded on entity law; each corporation had its own
juridical identity and its own rights and liabilities including its statutory
obligations, separate and distinct from those of its shareholders. With
statutory law focusing on the regulated company, the regulatory program did
not reach subsidiaries and affiliates of the regulated company. Evasion of the
program and frustration of the statutory objectives were easily achieved
through manipulation of the corporate structure.
15
By 1933, it was apparent that the older statutory approaches drafted in
terms of conventional principles of corporate law were making effective
regulation almost impossible. 6 Confronted by the Great Depression and the
financial scandals of the 1920s, the Roosevelt Administration taking office
in 1933 rapidly moved forward with major regulatory statutes governing the
railroad, securities, public utilities, and investment company industries among
others. In these statutes, the Congress departed from past approaches and
firmly adopted principles of enterprise law. The statutes utilized control 7
as the fundamental concept to bring an entire enterprise - subsidiaries and
affiliated companies of the regulated company as well as the regulated
company - under the statutory program. In the ensuing half-century, this
model has persisted, and control has been the foundation for innumerable
federal and some state regulatory programs.'"
In these statutory programs, which expressly utilize enterprise principles
15. E.g., United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R., 298 U.S. 492 (1936); United States
v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909). At times, the Interstate Commerce
Commission has adopted the same emasculating approach. See Stock of Denver & Rio
Grande Western R.R., 70 I.C.C. 102 (1921).
16. See generally JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING
COMPANY: ITS PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION (1932).
17. The holding company statutes and the Investment Companies Act refer not only to
"control" but also to "controlling influence." Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA),
15 U.S.C. § 79b(7)(A), (B) (1994); Investment Company Act (ICA), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9)
(1994); Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(a-c) (1996). A
major, unresolved issue is the extent to which "controlling influence" differs from "control."
See 4 LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1691-1703 (3d ed. 1990).
In an early pronouncement for PUHCA purposes, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) made plain the expansive scope of controlling influence. It stated that "the existence
of a controlling influence may frequently be the result of complex and subtle intercorporate
relationships based upon historical, traditional or contractual associations regardless of the
amount of voting stock held." In Re United Corp., PUHCA, Release No. 35-4478, 13 S.E.C.
854, 885 (Aug. 14, 1943); see Kaneb Pipe Line Co., PUHCA Release No. 35-1625043 S.E.C.
976 (1968).
18. See generally BLUMBERG & STRASSER: STATE STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, §§ 3
to 7, 10, 13; BLUMBERG & STRASSER: SPECIFIC STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 2 to 7, 16
to 23, 25, 29; see also BLUMBERG: GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1.
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and are referred to as statutes of specific application, 9 control serves as the
linchpin for determining the outer reach of regulatory programs founded on
enterprise principles. In order to implement fully their underlying objectives,
policies, and purposes, these statutes in many instances go well beyond the
corporation directly subject to its provisions to include other corporation(s)
(the parent corporation) that controlled the corporation, that it controlled
(subsidiaries), and with which it was under common control (sister
subsidiaries).20 Through the concept of control and the complementary
doctrine of an affiliate, these statutes reach all components of the enterprise
of which the company directly regulated is a part.
This experience contrasts with other federal statutes that are drafted in
general terms without any statutory or administrative reference to corporate
groups or to control. These are the so-called statutes of general application.
Enterprise principles, which make no appearance in these statutes, are
introduced, if at all, solely through judicial decisionmaking in determining
the scope of statutory application.
Finally, judicial decisionmaking governs the determination of common
law controversies involving private parties. In this third area, traditional
entity law predominates. With some growing exceptions, the attribution of
the rights and liabilities of a subsidiary corporation (or other group affiliate)
to its parent corporation (or another group affiliate) is possible only in those
"rare" and "exceptional" cases that meet the rigorous requirements of
"traditional piercing the veil jurisprudence." Under this traditional view, not
simply control but an "excessive" exercise of control over the subsidiary (or
controlled) corporation is required, along with other factors.2
This is a brief introduction to a summary description of the response of
the three great divisions of U.S. law to the legal problems presented by U.S.
corporate groups organized in hierarchical form and operating under the
control of the parent corporation. While such groups were organized with
varying patterns of operational centralization or decentralization, the parent's
power to control these instances was unquestioned. As reviewed in the
succeeding sections, the issue for analysis is the legal significance of the
shifting role of control and shared control in these three jurisprudential areas.
19. In some statutes, such as those under the labor laws, enterprise principles have been
incorporated into the regulatory structure by administrative decisions even though the statutes
themselves are drafted in general terms.
20. See BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994); ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(40) (1994). This
supplementary definition is widely employed for the definition of "affiliates," a class subjected
to some but not all of the responsibilities imposed by the Act. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 5100.5
(West 1996).
21. See BLUMBERG: SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 1, § 6.
(Vol. 10
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B. Statutes of Specific Application
1. Introduction
The great U.S. industries are almost uniformly regulated by federal
statutes specifically adopting enterprise principles in varying degrees as the
foundation of the regulatory programs. These include such key industries as
banking and savings and loan institutions, securities, investment companies,
transportation, energy, and communications. In addition, numerous federal
statutes expressly employ enterprise principles in regulating designated
business activities and practices that cross industry lines. These include
major federal statutes dealing with foreign trade, including export and import
controls, foreign investment, national boycotts, and foreign corrupt practices.
All adopt enterprise principles to expand the outer range of application of the
regulatory program and to prevent evasion and frustration of the statutory
objectives. Except in isolated areas, "control" serves as the statutory key for
imposing the regulatory program, broadening the area of application to
include controlling persons and other companies in the corporate group of
which the regulated corporation is a component.22 Comparable state statutes
adopt enterprise principles in pervasive regulatory programs for governing
banking and savings and loan, insurance, 23 and casino gambling holding
company systems. 2
4
Under all these statutes, as implemented by the administrative regulations
thereunder, the concept of control occupies a central role in determining
which parties are subject to the regulatory program. Although there are
innumerable variations in the statutory definition of control, they are, in the
end, very much alike. They all center on an ability to control the
decisionmaking of the corporation.
There are two variables when considering the various standards of
control. Control assumes a different meaning and significance depending on
both the statute and the particular context of the statute at issue. From
statute to statute and from context to context, control may play a different
role for different purposes. In many areas, the mere possession of control is
sufficient to subject a party to the statutory program. This readily permits
22. See BLUMBERG: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, § 22.
23. REVISED MODEL INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT
(IHCSRA) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1984), Model Reg. Serv. 440-27 (Jan. 1992); see
BLUMBERG & STRASSER: STATE STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 7.03, at 286 n.8 (collecting
statutes).
24. E.g., Nevada Gaming Control Act, NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.010-.720 (1995); Casino
Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-26, 5:12-28, 5:12-47 (West 1996); see BLUMBERG &
STRASSER, STATE STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 13.
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imposition of statutory obligations on parties sharing control. In other
contexts, application of the statute may require some exercise of control, and
the significance of shared control depends on the degree of involvement in
the operations and decisionmaking of the controlled corporation by each of
the parties sharing control. In statutes of specific application, control has the
primary role. The legislature and the administrative agency applying the
program have spoken: The role of the courts is not to determine the
applicable standards but instead to implement the statute in question as
construed by the agency. The role of administrative agencies in this area is
of great importance. They have typically utilized their enormous discretion-
ary powers to expand significantly the breadth of the statutory coverage. By
contrast, the courts under the statutes of general application and in common
law matters have been reluctant to undertake such heroic measures.
At the outset, it should be noted that where a statute defines control in
terms of a specified proportion, usually a majority of the voting stock, other
standards of control become irrelevant. While still not uncommon, this
simplistic approach to statutory drafting, which invites corporate manipulation
to sidestep a regulatory program, no longer plays a major role in U.S.
regulatory law that expressly addresses the problems presented by corporate
groups and parent and subsidiary corporations. Most statutes employing
enterprise principles rely on functional definitions of control in which
arithmetical standards of stock ownership do not play a decisive role. The
discussion divides into two classes. First are the statutory programs in which
both the statute and the administrative regulations define control. These are
generally, but not always, the great holding company statutes. Second are
the statutes that either do not refer to control, or if they do, fail to define it.
In these, the administrative regulations are the sole source of definition.
2. Holding Company Statutes Pervasively Applying
Enterprise Principles
a. Federal
The federal holding company statutes, which regulate the banking,
savings and loan, and public utility industries, and the state statutes, which
regulate the banking, savings and loan, insurance, and casino gambling
industries, focus on the parent company and the system or group that it
operates. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA)
isolated control as the central defining standard in extending a statutory
program to include all component companies of the holding company system,
[Vol. 10
SHARED CONTROL
thereby subjecting the entire enterprise to pervasive regulation.25  The
Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) utilized much the same structure in
accomplishing its less pervasive objectives.26 The Bank Holding Company
Act (BHCA)27  and the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act
(SLHCA) 28 substantially adopted the PUHCA model. Their variations
subsequently became the basis for the Model Insurance Holding Company
System Regulatory Act (IHCSRA), 29 which has been substantially adopted
in its original or revised form by almost all state jurisdictions. 0
These are the great holding company statutes that pervasively apply
enterprise principles in extending governmental regulation over a key
industry. They all employ a series of alternative standards, any one of which
will support a finding of control. These standards are very much the same
but with incidental variations. To illustrate both the general approach of all
these statutes as well as to indicate the nature of the variations, this
discussion will review the BHCA and SLHCA models, which are representa-
tive of this class of statutes.
Under the BHCA model, control may be established by satisfying any
one of three standards. 3' First, control arises from ownership or control of
twenty-five percent or more of any class of the controlled company's voting
securities, whether arising "directly or indirectly or acting through one or
more other persons. 32 Second, control exists if the holder "controls in any
manner the election of a majority of the directors. 33 Third, the administra-
tive agency has the power "after notice and hearing, ... [to determine
whether] the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence
over the management or policies of the bank."34  Finally, where control
exists, the statutes extend to all other members of the corporate group as
25. PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79(b)(7); see BLUMBERG & STRASSER, SPECIFIC STATUTORY
LAW, supra note 1, § 2.
26. ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-52.
27. BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841-50.
28. SLHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a)(2) (1994).
29. BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATE STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 7.04, at 290-91.
30. Id. § 7.03, at 285; see IHCSRA, Model Reg. Serv. 440-27.
31. BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A).
32. Id. The SLHCA provisions substantially follow the BHCA in most respects but not
without certain interesting variations. Its statutory standard is more than 25% of "the voting
shares," 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(2)(A), while the BHCA specifies 25% or more of "any class
of voting securities," 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A). Further, while the BHCA refers to control
arising "directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons," id., the SLHCA
refers to persons acting "directly or indirectly or acting in concert with one or more other
persons," 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(2)(A). Thus, literally in any event, the BHCA confines itself
to persons that are acting in an agent-like capacity while the SHLCA appears more expansive
to include a number of persons acting as principals.
33. BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(B).
34. Id. § 1841(a)(2)(C).
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affiliates by providing "any company that controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with" the regulated company.35
The BHCA and SLHCA administrative regulations establish certain
"[r]ebuttable presumptions of control."36  However, it is of note that the
tests employed are not identical. The BHCA administrative regulations
provide that such a presumption arises in the event of ownership or control
of as a little as five percent of the total voting shares." The SLHCA
regulations, however, recognize a presumption only in the event of ownership
of ten percent or more of any class of voting stock or twenty-five percent of
total voting stock.3" In either case, such holdings must be coupled with
certain control factors. The SLHCA requires elements such as the following:
1. The holder is one of the two largest holders of any class of voting
stock or owns more than twenty-five percent of the shareholders'
equity.3
9
2. The holder is party to any agreement that enables it "to influence
a material aspect of the management or policies" of the controlled
company.
40
3. The holder and its nominees constitute at least one member of the
board of directors or serve as senior executive officers.4 1
The BHCA regulations specify much the same factors.
b. State
The states have adopted the model of the federal holding company
statutes in regulating corporate groups in bank and savings and loan
institutions, the insurance industry, and the casino gambling industry.42 The
state banking and savings and loan holding company statutes largely follow
the federal models, thereby facilitating the existing pattern of overlapping
federal and state regulation and supervision in the banking savings institution
industry.4
3
The Model IHCSRA and the revised IHCSRA, adopted by almost all the
35. Id. § 1843(k).
36. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.31(d)(2), 574.4(b), 574.4(c) (1996).
37. Id. § 225.31(d)(2)(ii).
38. Id. § 574.4(b)(i)-(ii).
39. Id. § 574.4 (c)(1-2).
40. Id. § 574.4 (c)(4)(ii).
41. Id. § 574.4 (c)(7), (8).
42. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 5100.5 (West 1995) (savings and loan); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 75-76-199 (1995) (gambling); NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.010 (1995) (gambling); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:12-1 (West 1996) (gambling).
43. See CAL. FN. CODE § 5100.5.
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states, also have substantially followed the SHLCA statutory formulations of
control and controlling influence." Thus, neither state banking and savings
and loan holding company statutes nor the IHCSRA present legal problems
that differ significantly from those of the pervasive federal holding company
statutes on which they are modelled.
The pervasive enterprise-wide regulatory state statutes that regulate casino
gambling comprise the other area in U.S. law comprehensively regulating
holding company systems through enterprise principles based on control.
Casino gambling in Nevada, New Jersey, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Illinois
has become a major U.S. industry.45 These businesses are frequently
operated by casino gambling subsidiaries forming part of holding company
systems, in which the parent corporation is often listed on a major stock
exchange.46
The regulatory statutes substantially follow the federal holding company
statutes, and in at least one respect, go far beyond the federal models.47
The state statutes venture beyond traditional definitions of control and extend
the scope of the regulatory program to include any company holding, directly
or indirectly, "any part" (presumably, even the tiniest holding) of the
securities of a casino licensee.4 - This remarkable provision reflects the
legislative concern for measures to protect against potential penetration by
criminal elements and corruption into the industry. It also illustrates the
widespread drafting principle in U.S. regulatory and revenue statutes that
makes statutory application turn on a standard described as control. It does
so even where, as in this instance, the definition clearly does not relate to the
level of share ownership required to determine or perhaps to influence
corporate management or policies.49
44. IHCSRA, Model Reg. Serv. 440-1, 440-27; see BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATE
STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 7.03 n.8 (collecting statutes); id. § 7.04, at 290-91. In at
least two respects, its definition of control is more expansive than that of the federal acts. The
IHCSRA refers to "possession" of the "power to direct the management and policies" while
the federal statutes in some instances refer to the "exercise" of the power. IHCSRA, § 1 C;
BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATE STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 7.04, at 291. Secondly,
the IHCSRA omits any requirement of ownership of a specified proportion of shares. Id.
45. Bruce Orwall, Casino Visits Rose in 1995, Survey Finds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1996,
at A7A; Pauline Yashihashi, Gambling: Bonanzas from Riverboat Casinos Buoy Fortunes of
More Cities, Gambling Firms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1993, at B 1, B5.
46. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in
Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 29 CONN. L. REV. 295, 312
(1996).
47. Id.
48. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-199(d), (e)(iii), (f), (k); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.4825,
463.486, 463.488. Interestingly, New Jersey modified this provision to read "any significant
part." N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-26, 5:12-28, 5:12-47.
49. The most obvious example are the definitions of "control" in the Internal Revenue
Code that refer to stock ownership without distinguishing whether the stock is voting stock
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The expansive use of control for the purpose of broadening the statutory
scope in the holding company statutes reflects the pervasive nature of the
regulatory programs.50  Although the experience obviously provides some
guidance in consideration of control under statutes with more selective
reliance on enterprise principles, the difference in the structure of such
statutes, as well as the differing underlying objectives and policies, must
always be taken into account. A final word of caution. One of the
unresolved issues in the U.S. law is the extent to which controlling influence
differs from control, and decisions finding controlling influence may provide
less than firm guidance for a determination of control.5'
3. Statutes Selectively Applying Enterprise Principles
In contrast to the holding company statutes reviewed above, there are
numerous statutory programs in which enterprise concepts are not used
pervasively throughout the program, but instead are specifically applied to the
affiliated or related parties of the company being regulated for selected
purposes of the regulatory statutes. 52  The federal statutes of this nature
include those dealing with foreign trade and investment; regulation of the
securities, communications, transportation, and energy industries; and
extraterritorially applying U.S. law to the foreign subsidiaries of an U.S.-
based multinational group, as well as to the multinational's own activities
abroad,53 in areas such as antiboycott activity, foreign corrupt practices, and
employment discrimination. Like the holding company statutes, these
statutes rely on substantially similar standards of control to determine the
applicability of the regulatory program. They do not, however, utilize the
or that refer to ownership of at least 80% of the stock, a requirement that goes far beyond the
percentage required for voting control. 26 U.S.C. §§ 368, 1504, 1563 (1994); see BLUMBERG
& STRASSER, SPECIFIC STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 15.
50. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3), 77o (1994); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994); PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7)-(8).
51. Professors Frankel, Loss, and Seligman conclude that the differences between the
controlling influence and control are differences of degree. I TAMAR FRANKEL, THE
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND THE INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT 501 (1978); 4 LOSs & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1727.
52. In many instances, the use of enterprise principles rest on express statutory provisions.
In others, such as labor relations, employment, and antidiscrimination, it rests on the use by
administrative agencies of enterprise concepts in applying the statutory program or on judicial
adoption of such administrative standards in cases involving closely related labor statutes.
Application to other areas has been widely rejected.
53. Extraterritorial application of U.S. law based on the effects doctrine of U.S. foreign
relations law, not on control also has taken place in U.S. securities and antitrust laws. See
generally Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations (Apr. 1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 416 (1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT]; 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, Supra
note 17, at 5016-32.
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overall definitional framework of the holding company statutes.
The labor relations, employment, and antidiscrimination statutes adopt a
somewhat different approach for selective application of enterprise standards.
These statutes rely not on control but on the unique "integrated enterprise"
standard that focuses on the labor dimensions of the interrelationship between
the dominant and subservient parties.
In view of the rich abundance of examples of statutory and administrative
references to control as the standard for determining the scope of regulatory
programs in these statutes selectively applying enterprise principles, a
comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Discussion is
confined to several illustrative areas: securities and investment company laws;
statutes dealing with foreign investment in the United States, foreign trade,
and participation in trade boycotts; and labor relations, employment, and
antidiscrimination statutes.
a. Securities Industry and Investment Companies
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
leading statutes that make considerable use of enterprise principles grounded
on control, but do so in a selective manner. The ICA has features of both
the pervasive and selective statutes, relying on controlling influence as well
as control.5 4 These statutory programs provide a particularly useful area in
which to inquire into the meaning of control. They were among the very
earliest of the statutes introducing enterprise principles into U.S. regulatory
law. Further, there is a substantial accumulation of decisions and materials
dealing with the issue. Finally, the statutory programs in these areas have
been superbly reviewed by Professors Loss and Seligman" and by Professor
Frankel,56 the leading U.S. scholars in these fields, providing valuable
insight into the role of control in the relevant regulatory programs.
Although control plays a major role in the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, neither these statutes nor their legislative
history provide any strict definition. This omission was deliberate in order
to avoid providing would-be evaders with a blueprint for evasion." In
contrast, the ICA substantially follows the definitional model of the PUHCA
with an extensive definition of control.5 8 It also relies on the concept of
54. ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9).
55. See 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at ch. 5.
56. See I FRANKEL, supra note 5 1, at ch. 7, passim.
57. See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1383-
73, at 26 (1934)), cert. denied sub nom. Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057, cert.
denied sub nora. Bankers Trust Co. v. Metge, 474 U.S. 1072 (1986).
58. ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9).
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controlling influence to supplement the standard of control.5 9
Professors Loss, Seligman, and Frankel make it plain that while the
concept of control is fundamentally the same in the security and investment
company areas, its precise formulation and application for purposes of the
statute at hand depends on the purpose of the particular statutory provision
and the context in which it arises.6' Professor Frankel further notes that
"[c]hanges in context may change the meaning of control even in one
statute.' Thus, control may exist for certain purposes of the statute but
not for others.62
The doctrine of control under the securities and investment company laws
has certain fundamental components. First, control is "the power to direct
... [or command] the management and policies" of a company.63 For most
purposes, the courts and the SEC have held that potential control or the
power to control will suffice, and that control need not in fact be exer-
cised.64 Second, the power to control may not be legally enforceable, but
may instead arise from personal, historic, or economic sources.65 Third, it
may be active, or in some contexts it may be latent and passive. 66 Thus,
one court has held that control exists for purposes of the securities laws
where "major decisions are probably seldom taken without consulting" the
controlling person.67
The range of statutory liability imposed by the "controlling persons"
standard is so extensive that both securities acts contain provisions covering
special defenses for controlling person statutory liability under the statutes. 68
In summary, for some purposes of the securities and holding company
statutes, the outer circle of impact on decisionmaking, arising from "veto" or
"consultation" power, has been accepted as control in the contexts presented.
Whether this far reaching view of shared control in the implementation of
these statutes will be accepted in other statutory areas is far from clear.
59. Id.
60. 1 FRANKEL, supra note 51, at 495-96; 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at ch. 5.
61. 1 FRANKEL, supra note 51, at 496.
62. Id.
63. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1996).
64. See, e.g., Phillips v. SEC, 388 F.2d 964, 970-72 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Chicago Corp.,
28 S.E.C. 463, 469 (1948); In re M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 588-89 (1941).
65. See I FRANKEL, supra note 51, at 497.
66. Id. at 498.
67. In re Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. at 468 (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 77-
246, pt. 4, at 2 (1941)); see 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1715 n.24.
68. The Securities Act of 1933 excludes liability in cases where there was "no knowledge
or reasonable ground to believe" in the alleged underlying facts. 15 U.S.C. § 77o. The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does much the same thing, excluding liability where the
controlling person acts in "good faith and.., not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts




The statutory programs dealing with foreign investment in the United
States, foreign trade, and the antiboycott laws provide additional insight into
the use of control in the statutes selectively applying enterprise principles.
Federal controls on foreign investment in the United States present a
mixed picture. In some instances, including the Exon-Florio amendment to
the Export Administration Act69 and the International Investment and Trade
in Services Survey Act,7" which require disclosure of foreign direct and
portfolio investment, including acquisition of U.S. real estate, control is the
decisive factor determining applicability of the legislation.
The proposed regulations to implement the Exon-Florio Amendment
defined the critical statutory term "foreign person" to include "any person or
entity who 'is or can be' controlled by a foreign interest"' and then defined
"control" in what appears to be the second most detailed phraseology in U.S.
federal law. 72 It was proposed that control be defined as:
69. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (1996).
70. 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1994).
71. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,749, 29,751 (1989), to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.211(b),
800.213.
72. Id. State law provides an even more extensive example. A Pennsylvania statute
dealing with certification as a women's business enterprise for qualification under certain
statutory programs first defines a "women's business enterprise" as a concern in which "at
least 51% of the stock ... is owned by one or more women and whose management and daily
business operations are controlled by one or more of the women who own it." 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 4107.2(b) (West 1995).
The statute expands its definition of control in what appears to be the most complex
elaboration of the concept of control in all of U.S. statutory law. Instead of being confined
to control of the Board of Directors and the power to direct the policies or management of a
company, the statute goes on to deal with the composition of management in remarkable
detail. Id. In the end, it is not dealing with control at all, as the term is used in the
corporation law, but with gender representation in specified aspects of the management
structure. Id. It provides:
"Control." The exclusive or ultimate and sole control of the business including, but
not limited to, capital investment and all other financial property, acquisition,
contract negotiation, legal matters, officer-director-employee selection and
comprehensive hiring, operating responsibility, cost-control matters, income and
dividend matters, financial transactions and rights of other shareholders or joint
partners. Control shall be real, substantial and continuing not pro forma. Control
shall include the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of the business and to make the day-to-day as well as major decisions in
matters of policy, management and operations. Control shall be exemplified by
possessing the requisite knowledge and expertise to run the particular business and
control shall not include simple majority or absentee ownership. Further, control
by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual or woman shall not be
deemed to exist in any case where any nonminority owner or employee of the
business is disproportionately responsible for the operation of the firm.
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the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and whether
or not exercised or exercisable through the ownership of a majority
or a dominant minority of the total outstanding voting securities...
or by proxy voting, contractual arrangements or other means,.., to
determine, direct, take, reach or cause decisions regarding:
(1) The sale, lease,.., transfer of... the principal assets of the
entity...;
(2) The dissolution of the entity;
(3) The closing and/or relocation of the production or research
and development facilities of the entity; [and]
(4) The termination or non-fulfillment of contracts.73
In the end, however, the agency decided that such detail was "unneces-
sary," concluding that administrative adjudication could provide even more
expansive construction. 4  Thus, the final Regulations restricted such
application only in the case of acquisitions resulting in a foreign person
holding ten percent or less of the outstanding voting securities."
In like manner, the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey
Act, authorizing the President to collect information on foreign direct and
portfolio investment in the United States, includes as "parents" or "affiliates"
subject to the Act corporations holding ten percent or more of the voting
stock of another corporation.76
Notwithstanding such expansive use of the concept of control in these
two statutes dealing with foreign investment generally, other federal statutes
that restrict foreign investment in such key industries as banking, communi-
cations, transportation, and various state statutes that prohibit foreign
investment in real estate, particularly agricultural real estate, typically have
relied solely on arithmetical tests of control, often majority ownership based
solely on stipulated percentages of stock ownership. They do not include any
functional standards that look at the economic realities of the relationship, as
are by now a commonplace in the great U.S. regulatory statutes.
c. Foreign Trade
Commencing with World War II, the United States has generally
extended the outer boundaries of statutes governing foreign trade to include
"any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." While sharing
Id.
73. 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,751 (1989), codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (1994).
74. Compare Proposed Regulation, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,749, with 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a).
75. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(d)(1).
76. 22 U.S.C. § 3102(7),(8) (1994).
[Vol. 10
SHARED CONTROL
this standard, the various statutes incorporating it have made no effort to
define it. The Foreign Asset Control (FAC) Regulations, however, rely on
enterprise principles and expand statutory coverage based on "persons subject
to the jurisdiction" to include all parties controlled by the company subject
to the act." In so doing, international law standards with respect to
nationality7" have been brushed aside as not determinative.79
Another statutory term, "United States person," which along with "person
subject to the jurisdiction" is at the heart of the Export Administration
Act,80 presents the important issue of "nationality." The FAC Regulations
ascribe nationality, for purposes of the Act, to a corporation based either on
its place of incorporation (or for civil law companies its principal place of
management or sidge)8 or on the nationality of its shareholders. 2 Thus,
it departs from the traditional reliance solely on place of incorporation or
sidge"3 by introducing the nationality of the shareholders as well. In
consequence, dual nationality becomes a possibility in the case of a
corporation incorporated in one nation-state with shareholders who are
nationals of a different nation-state.
Recognizing the widespread international distribution of shareholdings in
the large multinational corporations, the Regulations further provide that the
nationality of shareholders will be attributed to the corporation wherever
twenty-five percent or more of the shares are held by nationals of a particular
country; where the place of incorporation is in a different country, the
corporation is treated as being a national of both.' In cases of dual
nationality, the FAC Regulations provide that either nationality may be
utilized to support the application of the Act.8 5
Although the Export Administration Act makes no reference to control,
the FAC Regulations and several other regulations that govern trade with
77. 31 C.F.R. § 500.329(d) (1995).
78. E.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain Feb. 2, 1970), 1970 I.C.J. 4.
79. Thus, the European Union and other foreign nations have bitterly objected to U.S.
extraterritorial implementation of the FAC Regulations as "repugnant" to international law.
Joseph E. Pattison, Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Export Administration Act in, EXPORT
CONTROLS 87, 88 (Michael R. Czinkota & Scot Marciel eds., 1984); Clyde H. Farnsworth,
U.S. to Penalize Those Violating Curbs on Soviet, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1982, at Al.
80. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402(5), 2404(a)(1) (1994).
81. 31 C.F.R. § 500.302. Although the common law countries use the state of
incorporation standard, the European civil law countries employ the concept of the sidge or
seat of the principal management. See TIMRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 213, reporters'
note.
82. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.302-.303 (FAC Regs.); id. § 515.330(a)(4) (Cuban Assets Control
Regs.).
83. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 4.
84. 31 C.F.R. § 500.303(c).
85. Id. § 500.303(a).
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designated nations apply the prohibitions and licensing requirements of the
statute to parties controlled by U.S.-based multinational corporations, thereby
including foreign subsidiaries. 86 These include the regulations that estab-
lished the embargoes against China, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and
Cuba.
In some programs, however, concerns about imposing too high a barrier
to U.S. trade opportunities or the likelihood of confrontation with nations that
are U.S. trading and political partners have resulted in a curtailment of the
regulatory program. In these programs, the regulations carefully exclude
foreign subsidiaries from some or all of the regulatory program. Such
exclusions include the Cuban Assets Control Regulations prior to 1992, the
Libyan Sanctions Regulations, the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Sanctions Regulations, the
Unita (Angola) Sanctions Regulations, and the antiboycott provisions of the
Export Administration Act.87
(i) Cuban Assets Control Regulations
Until 1992, the Cuban embargo was distinctly looser than the comparable
embargoes against China in connection with the Korean War8 and against
the Soviet Union in connection with the Siberian Pipeline at the time of its
invasion of Afghanistan and intrusion into Poland.89 Although the Cuban
regulations utilized the same sweeping concept of control, the substantive
licensing provisions contained a vital exception for thirty years until the
passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. 9 Until then, in the same
manner as the China and Soviet Union embargoes, the Cuban regulations
defined a "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and "a
person within the United States" to include "[a]ny corporation ... wherever
organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by" U.S. individuals
or corporations. 9' However, in contrast to the more far-reaching China and
Soviet Union embargoes, for thirty years, the Cuban regulations attempted to
avoid or minimize confrontation with other powers. They did so by
expressly authorizing certain Cuban transactions by United States-owned or
controlled corporations located in third countries "where local law requires,
86. Id. §§ 500.329(d), 500.330(a)(4); §§ 515.329(d), 515.330(a)(4) (Cuba); § 535.329(d)
(Iran).
87. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402-2420.
88. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515.
89. 31 C.F.R. pt. 500, § 505.10; 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982).
90. Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992), (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994)).
91. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.329(d), 515.330(a)(4).
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or policy ... favors[] trade with Cuba., 9 2 To qualify, an affiliate granted
such a license had to be "generally independent, in the conduct of transac-
tions of the type for which the license [was] ... being sought, in such
matters as decision-making, risk-taking, negotiation, financing or arranging
of financing, and performance. 93 These references on the role of control
in enforcing the Cuban embargo appear to have contemplated the exercise of
control in a hierarchical relationship, but throw no light on the treatment of
a case of shared control.
This relaxation of the embargo came to an end with the enactment of the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, subsequently stiffened even further by the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. 9' These
statutes significantly extended the outer boundaries of the coverage of the
Cuban trade controls by giving full range to the concept of control.95 The
1992 Act expressly prohibited the issuance of further licenses pursuant to the
earlier exclusion and thereby barred all foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based
multinationals from trade with Cuba.96
(ii) Antiboycott Regulations
The Antiboycott Act 97 (an amendment of the Export Administration
Act) sets forth the general policy of the United States "to oppose restrictive
trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against
92. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(b). Subsection 559 authorized the issuance of special licenses
for such foreign transactions in cases where:
(i) The commodities to be exported are non-strategic;
(ii) United States-origin technical data (other than items related to mainte-
nance, repair and operations data) will not be transferred;
(iii) U.S.-origin parts and components ... ha[ve] been authorized by the
Department of Commerce;
(iv) U.S.-origin spares ... ha[ve] been authorized by the Department of
Commerce;
(v) No U.S. Dollar accounts are involved; and
(vi) Any financing ... by a U.S.-owned or controlled firm is granted on
normal short-term conditions ....
Id. § 515.559b(l)(i)-(vi).
93. Id. § 515.559(d). No person within the United States, including the parent corporation
or any officer or employee, may assist or participate in the negotiation or performance of the
transaction in question. Id.
94. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6003 (Supp. 1997); Pub. L. No. 104-14, § 102, 110 Stat. 792-94
(1996).
95. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005; Pub. L. No. 104-14, § 102, 110 Stat. at 792-94. Among other
things, the Libertad Act penalizes persons "involved in the confiscation or trafficking in
confiscated American property" by denying entry into the United States for any alien who is
a controlling person of any such entity." Id. § 401(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 822.
96. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (a)(1).
97. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994).
1996]
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
other countries friendly to the United States or against any United States
person."9 It was aimed at the secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel by
the Arab States.9 9 It also was aimed at personal boycotts of individuals, and
organizations that include such individuals, because of their religion, national
origin, or the like. Notwithstanding the primary statutory objective to deter
U.S. participation in the Arab Boycott, the regulations are tempered by a
desire not to impede excessively U.S. trade with Arab nations, particularly
where conducted by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.
The outer boundaries of the antiboycott regulatory program rests on three
crucial statutory terms: "United States persons," "controlled in fact," and
"commerce of the United States."
United States persons. The statute directs the President to "issue
regulations prohibiting any United States person" from intentionally
complying with or supporting such boycotts in its "activities in the interstate
or foreign commerce of the United States."' °  It defines "United States
persons" to include "any foreign subsidiary or affiliate ... of any domestic
concern which is controlled in fact by such domestic concern."''
Controlled in fact. "Controlled in fact" is a statutory standard requiring
proof not merely of control but of the "authority or ability of a domestic
concern to establish the general policies or to control the day-to-day
operations" of its foreign subsidiary, affiliate, or establishment. 0 2  This
definition is remarkably loose. In many cases arising under other contexts,
a parent's control over the "general policies" of a subsidiary has been
regularly brushed aside as characteristic of many, if not most, group
interrelationships and therefore without legal significance.0 3 On the other
hand, control over day-to-day operations is near universally accepted as a
touchstone of vicarious liability or other attribution of legal rights and
responsibilities for parent and subsidiary corporations.' 4  The statute
establishes a rebuttable presumption of control where the same individuals
98. Id. § 2402(5).
99. In a "primary" boycott, the boycotting country refuses to buy the products of
boycotted countries. In a "secondary" boycott, the boycotting country refuses to buy products
of third parties not observing the primary boycott. In a "tertiary" boycott, the boycotting
country brings pressure on third parties to abstain from trading with parties blacklisted for not
participating in a primary boycott. Id.
100. Id. § 2407(a)(1).
101. Id. § 2415(2).
102. 15 C.F.R. § 760.1(c) (1) (1997).
103. See Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1466, 1476-77 (3d Cir. 1988);
Miles v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1976).
104. E.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1993); Curtis Pub'g Co.
v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1962); Rae Prods. & Chems. Corp. v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8390, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1994); see BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 1, § 3.05.2.
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comprise a majority of the domestic concern and the foreign firm, or where
the domestic concern has the authority to appoint a majority of the foreign
board or its chief executive.1"5
Commerce of the United States. Reflecting the ambivalence of the Act,
the regulations carefully restrict the situations that are included within the
foreign commerce of the United States to which the Act is directed. These
situations include acts of a "United States person" such as "specifically
directing the activities" of the foreign concerns, furnishing financing for a
foreign transaction, and "providing financial, accounting, legal, transportation,
or other ancillary services" in connection with a foreign transaction. 1' 6
This is directed only against the "United States person"; the underlying
transaction itself is not deemed to be within "United States commerce." 107
Transactions by a foreign concern entirely outside the United States are only
in "United States commerce" when they involve United States goods,
services, or information acquired from persons in the United States for
purpose of filling an order or used in the manufacture of another product for
purpose of filling the order. 10 8
Supplementing these provisions, section 999 of the Internal Revenue
Code denies certain tax benefits to taxpayers cooperating in the Arab or any
other proscribed international boycott.' 9 In addition, it contains extensive
reporting provisions." ° These include not only the taxpayer, but also any
corporate group of which the taxpayer is a member, thereby including all
parent, subsidiary, and affiliate companies, including subsidiaries in which
it holds directly or indirectly more than ten percent of the shares."'
d. Labor Relations, Employment, and Antidiscrimination
The federal statutes regulating labor relations, discrimination, and other
employment problems provide a final illustrative example of the application
of statutes selectively introducing enterprise principles. These labor and
employment statutes are unique. Resting on administrative and judicial
action, these statutes receive a sweeping enterprise construction that, unlike
other areas of U.S. law, rests not on the usual standards of control, but on a
unique "integrated enterprise" standard.
Reliance on enterprise concepts under these statutory programs originated
with the administrative implementation of the labor relations laws. Although
105. 15 C.F.R. § 760.1(c)(2).
106. Id. § 769.1 (d)(2)-(5).
107. Id. § 769.1(d)(4), (5).
108. Id. § 760.1(d).
109. 26 U.S.C.A. § 999 (1996).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 999(a)(1), (e).
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the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 is entirely silent on the matter,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) gave a dramatic enterprise
construction to such fundamental terms as "employer" and "employee," going
far beyond their common-law definition.'13 In an action supported by the
courts," 4 the NLRB established an integrated enterprise standard for
determining a "single employer" for vital purposes of the Act."5 In
determining the jurisdiction of the statute depending on the number of
employees, in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit, and in
assessing responsibility for unfair labor practices, the Board abandoned
reliance on the separate juridical existence of related parties and replaced the
traditional common-law standard with the integrated enterprise standard
fashioned for the purpose."
6
The integrated enterprise standard relies on four operational or structural
elements of the related companies: "interrelation of operations, common
management, centralized control of labor relations and common ownership"
(or financial control of the related companies)." 7 It is settled that central-
ized control of labor relations is the most important of the four elements, and
that it is not necessary for all other elements to be present.1
8
The integrated enterprise standard not only governs labor relations law,
but also governs numerous other statutory areas in the labor and employment
field. As will be seen, the Congress has expressly adopted it for certain
employment discrimination questions. The Regulations under the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act similarly incorporate the
integrated enterprise standard to determine when member companies of a
corporate group constitute a single employer."9  Finally, the courts have
widely applied it in the construction of other statutes in the labor and
employment field, including the Fair Wages and Hours Act and the
antidiscrimination employment statutes. Like the NLRA, these statutes
contain no reference to control or otherwise endorse enterprise principles.
120
112. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
113. 21 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 14-15 (1956).
114. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam) [hereinafter Radio & Television
Broadcast Union].
115. Id.
116. 21 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP., supra note 113, at 14-15; see Radio & Television Broadcast
Union, 380 U.S. at 256.
117. Radio & Television Broadcast Union, 380 U.S. at 256 (citing Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc.,
332 F.2d 902, 903 (9th Cir. 1964)); 21 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP., supra note 113, at 14.
118. E.g., Carpenters' Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens, 743 F.2d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir.
1984); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr., Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 385 (9th Cir. 1979).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1) (1994), 20 C.F.R. § 693.3(a)(2) (1997).
120. The antidiscrimination statutes were subsequently amended to incorporate the
integrated enterprise standard for purposes of extraterritorial application.
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- Perhaps, the greatest triumph of the enterprise standard has occurred in
the employment discrimination area. In this area, the courts have widely
refused to approve extraterritorial application. They did so in the case of the
labor relations,'2 ' employment,' 22 and antidiscrimination statutes 23 be-
cause the statutes fail to include a clear statement by the Congress. In the
case of the antidiscrimination statutes, however, the Congress chose to
overrule the judicial decisions. It expressly extended the coverage of the
antidiscrimination statutes to workers employed abroad by controlled foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.124 Congress did so by introducing the
concept of control, which it defined by incorporating in haec verba the
NLRB integrated enterprise standard.' 25
With centralized control of labor relations as its key factor, the integrated
enterprise standard is a vivid example of how the meaning of control reflects
the context in which it is being used. This standard is nearly irrelevant in
other contexts. Controlled foreign subsidiaries for labor purposes constitute
a very different class than controlled foreign subsidiaries for purposes for
which centralized control of labor relations is not an indispensable element.
Accordingly, the doctrine is inapplicable in areas other than labor relations,
employment, and discrimination matters.
4. Control and Shared Control in Statutes of Specific Application
Under statutes of specific application, the mere possession of control is
typically decisive for imposition of statutory liability on the controlling party
and frequently for application of enterprise liability to an affiliated corpora-
tion. The legislation as implemented by the administrative agency with
jurisdiction has so provided. This decisive role for control has led to a
correspondingly expanded imposition of liability for a party with shared
control.
Many statutes of specific application and the regulations thereunder
expressly acknowledge that shared control or some form thereof is sufficient
to trigger the application of the statute. They do so by references, making
it clear that control may be possessed or exercised by the collective action
of several holders. Thus, the statutes and regulations typically provide that
121. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963);
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143 (1957).
122. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 593 (1953) (Jones Act); Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 281 (1949) (Eight Hour Day Act).
123. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 244 (1991) (Aramco).
124. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (1994) (ADEA).
125. It may be noted that this is still another illustration of the use of control as a legal
standard in this area that is entirely unrelated to control over the election of a majority of the
members of the board of directors.
1996]
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
control may arise "directly or indirectly.' 26  They refer to "controlling
shareholders" in the plural, to shareholders "acting in concert,' 27 or to
control arising "pursuant to an arrangement" or "understanding," or a
"contract," or "otherwise.,02' They expressly recognize that it is irrelevant
whether control is exercised alone or through others.1 29
Control exercised through others adds little to the common law doctrines
that otherwise would have governed. Control exercised through agents,
intermediaries, or shams remains, notwithstanding the interposition of another
juridical entity, the act of the shareholder with control. This is merely a
variation of the form in which a shareholder may exercise control without the
consultation or participation of others. It is not shared control, it is agency.
Control exercised in concert is something else again. Where control
means the power to elect a majority of the board of directors and thereby
direct or command the direction of the management and policies of the
corporation, as it does in most statutes of specific application to corporate
groups, the power may be exercised solely or by a group of shareholders.
The participating parties in such a control group collectively occupy the role
that has been identified as the triggering factor for the application of the
statutory program. Such statutory references in the holding company laws,
accordingly, represent an express adoption of the concept of shared control.
For a group, however, to have control under these circumstances, it must be
cohesive, and the members must act in concert. Their collective action in the
election of directors must be accomplished through consultation and
coordination. 30
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that shared control under such
statutes presents no inherent, conceptual difficulties in imposing statutory
obligations on all members of the control group. It gives rise only to
evidentiary problems when examining the group dynamics in order to
determine the nature of the participation of the individual constituents of the
group allegedly asserting control.
The antiboycott statute and regulations provide insight into the nature of
shared control in a very different context. In this area, the provisions
extending the regulatory program to include subsidiaries "controlled in fact"
have been given an expansive construction to include certain types of shared
126. SLHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(2); BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A)(c); Securities
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(a); PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. 79b(7); ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9);
FLA. STAT. § 665.034(4)(a) (1995).
127. SLHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(2)(A); FLA. STAT. § 665.034(4)(a).
128. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o; PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7)(B);
Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1996) (Rule 405).
129. BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A).




control. The regulations provide that twenty-five or more percent voting
stock ownership will satisfy the controlled-in-fact standard if no one else
owns an equal or larger percentage. However, if concerns with minority
holdings that in the aggregate satisfy this requirement regularly pool their
shares and vote "in concert," they are collectively presumed to have
control. 3 ' For these purposes, all the participants have joined in the final
formulation of the corporate action. Participation in the collective process
stamps them all as parties with control. This is an active or direct example
of shared control. However, the reference plainly does not extend to passive
parties possessing no more than a "veto" or "consultation" power.
However, under certain statutes of specific application, including the
securities laws and the pervasive holding companies statutes, the statutory
program includes not only persons acting in concert, but under certain
circumstances, even other shareholders who are distinctly less active, or even
passive or inactive. In these areas, the governing statute imposing controlling
person liability expressly turns on control, with the mere possession of
control or participation in shared control deemed sufficient for statutory
liability in many contexts. Thus, it is no surprise that so much of the legal
material available on the legal implications of shared control relates to the
holding company and securities laws.
Thus, where a party does not participate in the final determination of
policy, its indirect or passive participation in the preliminary processes of
decisional evaluation before final decision also may be viewed as control for
certain purposes. The SEC and the courts have gone further. Even where
a party does not participate in the preliminary stages of the decisionmaking
process but only is consulted or has a veto power before the other members
of the control group proceed with their decision, the SEC and the courts have
recognized that this somewhat diminished power still may satisfy the
requirements of control (or of controlling influence) for certain aspects of the
statutes at issue. This ready acceptance of passive "voice" as sufficient for
control is most apparent under the statutes utilizing enterprise principles
pervasively.
In other statutes of specific application that apply enterprise principles
and the concept of control only in selected areas,'32 shared control no
longer plays an important role. As the experience in the foreign trade and
investment area illustrates, there are virtually no materials on the role of
131. Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts Act, 15 C.F.R. § 760.3 (1996).
132. While the securities laws should be included as one of the class of statutes selectively
using enterprise principles, the SEC administering them has brought into play concepts of
control that extend much further than under other selective statutes. The SEC has evidently
been influenced by its development of control concepts in its administration of the PUHCA
with its pervasive utilization of enterprise principles.
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shared control except in its most active form with respect to concerted action'
in election of the board of directors. Neither the statute nor the regulations
provide guidance on whether less active participation in shared control will
suffice to trigger the application of the statutory program.
With their standard of the integrated enterprise for determining the
existence of a "single employer," the labor relations, employment, and
antidiscrimination statutes provide a final example of specific application of
enterprise principles.'33 As reviewed above, the crucial factor in this area
is not the general control or shared control over the different facilities or
operations in question, but the nature of control in their labor operations. If
control or shared control result in a "centralized control of [the] labor
relations" of the different facilities or operations in question, together with
other factors of lesser importance for this purpose, such as interrelationship
of operations, common management, and common ownership or financial
control, the operations will be deemed a "single enterprise" for purposes of
these statutes.
134
Since these issues primarily relate not to the parties participating in the
exercise of such shared control over labor matters, but to the facilities and
operations that are subject to it, the decisions in this area are of more limited
usefulness. If enterprise liability is found, it has important but not unrestrict-
ed consequences. It will result in a finding of statutory jurisdiction or a
determination that the separate facilities or operations constitute a single
bargaining unit or that one of the controlled companies has committed an
unfair labor practice. However, it does not lead to any group liability for
other purposes either under the statute or for other areas.
A final word of caution. As previously emphasized, it must be
recognized that even where the experience with respect to the statutes of
specific application provides instances of shared control sufficient to render
a party subject to the statutory program, such instances have application only
for the particular statute under consideration and further, only for the
particular context of the statute involved.
In summary, in the statutes expressly applying enterprise principles, the
statutes, regulations, and administrative adjudications play the primary role
in determining the other contours of the doctrines of control and shared
133. It is irrelevant that for purposes of the problem under review, in some of these
statutes, such as the labor relations and employment laws, the governing standards relying on
enterprise standards, including control, may be found in administrative regulations and
adjudication rather than in the statute. In either case, the applicable standard has been
determined when the case reaches the court.
134. See Radio & Television Broadcast Union, 380 U.S. at 256; 21 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP.,
supra note 113, at 14. As noted, courts have held the enterprise developments under the labor
laws to be irrelevant for purposes of consideration of whether enterprise principles should be
applied in nonlabor areas.
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control. The courts have a much reduced role, largely confined to enforcing
the enterprise principles applied by statute or administrative action.'35
Thus, in statutes of specific application, control serves as the decisive
factor determining the scope of the regulatory program. The picture changes
sharply where one moves to other areas of law. These other areas include
on the one hand, the construction and application of statutes of general
application, in which no specific reference is made either to control or to
corporate groups and on the other hand, judicial decisions considering issues
of enterprise liability or piercing the veil in common law controversies, either
involving the government in issues of great public importance or private
parties in which only private concerns are involved. 3 6
C. Statutes of General Application
1. Enterprise Law
In addition to the statutory programs specifically employing enterprise
principles based on control, there are numerous statutes in which neither the
Congress nor the agency administering the program has addressed the
problems presented by parent and subsidiary corporations and corporate
groups. These are the statutes referred to as the statutes of general
application. In construing and applying these statutes, the courts have
directly formulated enterprise principles in an impressive number of areas and
have widely expanded the range of application of the act, notwithstanding the
absence of any express statutory or administrative direction. This part briefly
considers this use of enterprise law and control in general before turning to
the environmental laws as the leading example of this development and
concludes with a discussion of the role of shared control in this area.
In introducing enterprise principles when construing statutes of general
application, the courts have utilized a variety of approaches to transcend
traditional legal doctrines in order to impose obligations on a parent or
subsidiary corporation for the statutory obligations of one of the corporations
affiliated with the group. In applying enterprise principles in the absence of
any direct statutory or administrative reference to imposition of liability on
the parent corporation or other affiliate, the courts have frequently rejected
application of state common law, consisting of traditional corporation law,
entity concepts, and the rigorous requirements of traditional piercing the veil
jurisprudence. They have instead introduced enterprise principles in the
formulation of an emerging federal common law that governs the construc-
tion of certain statutes. They have done so in order to implement more
135. See Tcherepnin v. Knight 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
136. See id.
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effectively the statutory policies and objectives, to prevent frustration of the
program, and to close the door to evasion of the law through the interposition
of a subsidiary. 3 '
This federal route to enterprise law has taken a number of forms. Some
courts have used the historic acceptance in federal law that regulatory statutes
are "remedial" statutes to be construed in a "broad" or "liberal" manner as
a starting point. 3 ' They have given an expansive construction to statutory
terms such as "employer" and "employee" in the labor relations, employment,
and antidiscrimination statutes, 39 and "owner" or "operator" in CERCLA
by defining the statutory terms pragmatically, according to the economic
realities of the enterprise in which they operate rather than by reference to
traditional doctrinal concepts of juridical identity.'"4 Under this conceptual
framework, courts have applied enterprise principles and imposed intra-
enterprise liability on group affiliates of companies committing the violations
in question. Other courts have rested an enterprise construction of a statute
squarely on pragmatic federal considerations without relying on a federal
construction of statutory terms. In General Telephone Co. v. United States,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld application of enterprise
principles in reliance on the judgment of the administrative agency essential
to preventing evasion of the statute. 4 ' The court said:
Where the statutory purpose could thus be easily frustrated through
use of separate corporate entities, the Commission is entitled to look
through the corporate form and treat the separate entities as one and
the same for purposes of regulation. . . . The Commission has
concluded that the ends it sought could not be achieved without
drawing carrier affiliates under the aegis of Section 214 and this we
137. Thus, major provisions of the railroad statutes in the 1920s had been avoided by
railroads and shippers conducting proscribed activities through subsidiaries or holding
companies. The courts refused to interfere so long as the subsidiaries had some real existence.
See United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936); United States v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 220 U.S. 257 (1911); see BLUMBERG, GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note
1, §§ 19.02.1-.4.
138. See generally Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 332;
United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. United States, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985).
139. After 60 years in which this philosophy of statutory construction has been supreme,
recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that it is reconsidering this approach. Patterson
v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
140. Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68
F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995); FMC Corp. v. Department of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir.
1994); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 1994);
Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
141. 449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. I0
SHARED CONTROL
find is permissible.' 42
Other decisions have utilized federal versions of modified piercing the
veil jurisprudence to accomplish an enterprise result. As is well known, the
traditional piercing standards will provide a basis for courts of equity to
intervene only in "rare" or "exceptional" cases. 4 3 The traditional piercing
doctrine employs standards that are rigorous, involve exaggerated respect for
corporate forms, and ignore economic realities. For application of the
traditional doctrine, the courts require violation of accepted corporate norms
and formalities, the intrusive exercise of the parent's (or controlling
shareholder's) power of control, and a demonstration that the corporate form
has been used to accomplish a fraudulent or inequitable objective. These
traditional standards make enterprise implementation of statutory programs
exceedingly difficult in cases where enterprises routinely utilize sophisticated
legal advice in establishing their corporate structure, financing, and
operational procedures.
Accordingly, in the statutory area, a number of courts have developed a
federal version of modified piercing jurisprudence that has significantly
broadened the extent of enterprise construction of a statute of general
application.'" They have accomplished this result through a number of
techniques.
Many courts have said that piercing in cases involving issues of public
policy and statutory law rests on different standards than those governing
common-law controversies between private parties. In particular, they have
singled out the importance of the corporate form, which plays a major role
under the traditional doctrine.'45 Illustrating this approach, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, in Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, which was
decided under the environmental laws, stated that in applying the federal law
on piercing the veil in the statutory area, "federal courts will look closely at
the purpose of the federal statute to determine whether the statute places
importance on the corporate form, . . . an inquiry that gives less respect to
the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine."'' "
As another technique for relaxing traditional piercing standards, some
other courts have held that the traditional requirement of "fraud or inequity"
or other "unfair" conduct victimizing the plaintiff does not apply in statutory
142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. See, e.g., Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981).
144. Blumberg, supra note 46, at 321, 328-32.
145. Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986); Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667
F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981); Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 738, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
see United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
("Thus corporate formalities cannot be used to circumvent a statutory policy.").
146. Town of Brookline, 667 F.2d at 221 (citation omitted).
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matters. These courts have held that proof of a violation of the statute by the
group component performing the proscribed activity satisfied any requirement
of this nature.'47 In so doing, the courts were rejecting the traditional view
in torts that proof of the commission of the tort was insufficient in itself to
constitute the "fraud or inequity" or "unfair" conduct essential for the
attribution of liability from one group component to another. 4 '
A final technique facilitating judicial use of enterprise principles has been
the adoption of liberalized notions of attribution of information and activity
from one group component to another because of the role of individuals who
simultaneously hold office in both group components involved. These courts
have rejected concepts of the traditional corporation law that focused on the
offices held and not on the presence of the same individual. The theory
relied on by the older law was that the acts and information of the individual
could not be attributed from one company to another. It was said that the
individual was wearing his or her "hat" as an officer of the particular
company in question, and the significance of the act or information was
restricted to that company.149 Some modem decisions have rejected this
"hats" theory as grossly unrealistic and utilize the role of the common officer
as a significant factor for application of liability for statutory matters;5 0
other courts have done the same for common-law purposes, particularly tort
matters.151
In the foregoing applications of enterprise principles, control plays a very
important role, but unlike so many statutes of specific application, it is not
decisive. In these instances, it is only one of a number of elements. The
emphasis has moved from the possession of control to the manner and extent
of its exercise. In consequence, shared control has a sharply reduced
significance in this area in contrast to its important role in many statutes of
specific application.
With the statutes of general application providing no textual support for
the applicability of enterprise principles, the courts in this area must turn to
147. E.g., United Steel Workers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1506-08
(11 th Cir. 1988).
148. See BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 1, § 9.03 (cases
not requiring supplemental showing of unfairness); id. § 9.02 (cases requiring proof of some
fraud, and inequitable, unfair, or morally culpable conduct in addition to the tort for piercing
in tort cases). Some cases dispose with the requirement where the subsidiary is devoid of
significant indicia of independent existence.
149. United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985); Edwards Co.
v. Monogram Indus., Inc. 730 F.2d 977, 985-86, 986 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1984).
150. Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984); see BLUMBERG,
SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 1, § 20.11, at 529-30.
151. American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Sandlin, 470 So. 2d 657, 668 (Ala. 1985); Electric
Power Bd. v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tenn. 1985); see
BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS § 10.2, at 190.
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federal or state common law. Thus, choice of law often plays a decisive role
at the very threshold of judicial consideration of the problem. 52
When choice of law is resolved in favor of the adoption of state common
law, enterprise liability rarely occurs. State common law means that the
matter is determined by traditional corporation law. Corporation law is
grounded on traditional entity law concepts, stressing the separate and distinct
juridical identity of each corporation, even in the case of subsidiaries
collectively conducting parts of an integrated enterprise under the control of
a parent corporation. For these courts, entity law inevitably prevails unless
the case is the "rare" or "exceptional" case that satisfies the rigorous
requirements of traditional piercing the veil jurisprudence. In consequence,
enterprise concepts receive no more than isolated recognition.
However, when courts apply federal common law to determine the outer
scope of the statute, they are able to turn to a well-developed body of federal
jurisprudence that has adopted the application of enterprise principles in
statutory construction and application. Such reference to federal common
law opens the door to the use of the foregoing liberal concepts of statutory
construction or of modified variants of piercing the veil jurisprudence to
support the imposition of enterprise liability in the enforcement of the
regulatory program.
2. Environmental Law
Environmental laws relating to hazardous waste provide a particularly
interesting example of judicial construction of a statute of general application
leading to the introduction of enterprise principles for expanding the scope
of the statutory program.'53 Statutory enforcement of environmental laws
has resulted in much litigation, providing numerous decisions that throw
considerable light both on the use of enterprise principles in statutes of
general application and on the significance of shared control.
Environmental laws comprise a series of statutes dealing with air, water,
and hazardous waste. In recent years, hazardous wastes in general, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) in particular, have occupied center stage and have been the
152. Choice of law for this purpose is far from clear. Where the court is proceeding
through construction of the federal statutes, they have frequently disagreed on whether federal
or state common law governs. Some of the courts applying federal common law have
conceded that they are "guided" by state law in so doing. However, where traditional piercing
the veil is the test, state law is the accepted standard.
153. For an interesting comparative discussion, see Karl Hofstetter, The Ecological Liability
of Corporate Groups: Comparing US and European Trends in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY ch. 5 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 1994).
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1994).
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subject of extended litigation. Along with the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, CERCLA provides an extensive regulatory program
controlling the generation, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes.
It imposes extensive liability on the "owners" or "operators" of facilities at
which hazardous wastes were disposed of and on any persons who "ar-
ranged" for the disposal of such wastes.
a. Construction of "Owner, " "Operator, " and "Arranger"
Most courts have agreed that the construction and application of the
provisions of CERCLA are to be governed by a uniform federal common
law.'55 They have further concluded that a "broad and liberal construction"
of the statutory terms of "owner," "operator," and "arranger" was required
to implement the underlying objectives and policies of the law.'56 This has
set the stage for the application of enterprise principles, leading to the
imposition of liability on the parent (or controlling shareholder) for the
subsidiary's (or controlled corporation's) CERCLA violations.
One of the most widely litigated issues under the statute relates to the
circumstances under which a parent corporation (or other controlling
shareholder) will be deemed an owner or operator or arranger for purposes
of the statute, by reason of the activities of its subsidiary (or controlled)
corporation violating the Act. This has become a fiercely disputed issue on
which the courts are divided. Numerous decisions, however contradictory in
approach and result, provide a substantial body of law and insight into the
significance of enterprise principles and the role of control and shared control
in this area.
In earlier cases, courts did not tend to distinguish between owner and
operator liability.5 7  More recently, however, courts have tended to
distinguish between the statutory references to "owner" and "operator" in
considering the imposition of liability on a parent corporation in connection
with a contaminated site owned by a subsidiary so as to make it liable for the
environmental violations of the subsidiary.'
155. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (D.R.I. 1989), af'd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); see United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (S.D. I11. 1984).
156. See, eg., Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 253-55; B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
1198-99 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
(D. Minn. 1982).
157. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
158. See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254-55; TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d at 1091-92; FMC Corp.,
29 F.3d at 833; Sidney S. Arst Co. 25 F.3d at 421; Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d at 1110; John S.
Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 408 (1st Cir. 1993); Carolina Transformer, 978
F.2d at 836-37.
The courts have generally agreed that "owner" liability must rest on veil piercing;
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Thus, relying on enterprise principles, no less than six Courts of Appeal,
joined by many minor courts, have upheld the imposition of enterprise
liability on parent corporations as operators. 159 These courts have relied on
a variety of factors. Some have relied on the extensive degree of the
parent's" general exercise of control over the affairs of the subsidiary and
of integration of the operations of parent and subsidiary. 6' Some courts
have relied on the parent or controlling shareholder's "actual,' 62 "ac-
tive," 63 or "day-to-day"'" involvement in the planning and implementa-
tion of the subsidiary's disposal practices in particular. Still others have
moved beyond "active" involvement, a standard that borders on traditional
tort concepts dealing with direct liability. They have imposed liability on
passive controlling persons who have failed to act notwithstanding their
"capacity to prevent and abate" the violation. 65
Thus, among these courts ready to apply enterprise principles, there is
significant disagreement over the degree of involvement by the parent
corporation (or its controlling shareholders) in the affairs of the subsidiary or
in the violations themselves that is required for attributive liability. In its
recent decision in Schiavone v. Pearce, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recognized this division but declined to resolve it."6
Led by the Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, a minority
of courts, however, have flatly held that intragroup liability under CERCLA
however, whether "operator" liability is so restricted is a highly controversial issue.
159. These include decisions of First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal. See cases cited supra note 158.
160. As used in the text, references to parent corporations also include individual or other
controlling shareholders and references to subsidiary corporations include controlled corpora-
tions.
161. Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1490, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990); Kayser-
Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 16; United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202-03 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. at 552-53.
162. Lansford-Coaldale Jt. Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993)
("actual control").
163. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 27 ("active involvement"); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("actively
participating"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987).
164. The Fishbein Family Partnership v. PPG Indus., Inc. 876 F. Supp. 764, 765 (D.N.J.
1994) ("day-to-day operations"); City of N. Miami v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401, 410-11 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
165. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d at 836-37; Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 506
U.S. 940 (1992); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 788 (W.D. Mich.
1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (finding that the
parent company "had the capacity, if not total reserved authority, to make decisions and
implement actions.., to prevent and abate the damage"); see Berger, 828 F. Supp. at 409-11;
Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 274 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
166. Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 254-55.
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may be imposed only where the traditional standards of piercing the veil
jurisprudence under applicable state law have been satisfied. 67 They have
rejected any manipulation of the terms "owner" or "operator" in order to
impose liability on parent corporations (and controlling shareholders) for
violation by a subsidiary (or controlled) corporation. They have contended
that such an important consequence should be imposed by Congress, not the
courts.
Where piercing is the standard, the imposition of CERCLA liability on
the parent corporations usually does not follow. The cases demonstrate that
the rigorous requirements of piercing the veil jurisprudence present a
formidable obstacle to attempts to impose enterprise liability under CERCLA
through this approach in its traditional form. Only a minority of courts have
imposed CERCLA liability based on piercing jurisprudence."6
In summary, the controversy over the fundamental standards governing
the imposition of CERCLA liability to component companies of corporate
groups, pursuant to enterprise concepts, is on-going. This is a fiercely
litigated area, and the final answer likely will not be available until the
Supreme Court rules.
b. Shared Control
In a number of CERCLA cases, the courts have been confronted not only
with consideration of the role of control in this area, but also with the
significance of shared control. In determining liability for purposes of
CERCLA, these cases not surprisingly have distinguished among the
members of the group sharing control depending on the precise nature of
each party's own role in the subsidiary's decisionmaking and management.
Most of these cases have involved the individual, controlling shareholders
of smaller business enterprises. Riverside Market Development Corp. v.
International Building Products Inc.69 involved two individual sharehold-
ers and their controlled corporation, which had violated CERCLA. T° The
court held the president, a fifteen-percent shareholder, potentially liable as an
operator. 7  He was at the factory three weeks out of every month and was
167. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir.), vacated, 67 F.3d
586 (1995); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991); see also Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., No.
CIV.A.90-2349-N, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9540, at *7 (E.D. La. June 23, 1992); United States
v. Arrowhead Ref. Co., No. 5-89-202, 1993 WL 170966, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 1993).
168. In its recent decision in Schiavone, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized the difficulty, but expressly declined to resolve it. 79 F.3d at 254 n.5.
169. No. CIV.A.88-5317, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6375, at *1 (E.D. La. May 22, 1990),
aff'd, 931 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1004 (1991).




actively involved in general management as well as in waste disposal.'
However, the court rejected liability for the chairman of the board who held
eight-five percent of the stock.173 He had no involvement in management
and participated in the enterprise only through review of financial materials
and board deliberations. 17
4
Nurad v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co. involved a closely held family
business.'75  The court imposed liability on the father, who acted as
president and exercised day-to-day control of the company.176 However,
it rejected the imposition of liability upon his two sons, who also were
officers but were less active in the business. 77
A third decision of this nature, City of N. Miami v. Berger, imposed
liability on two individual shareholder-officers, both holding thirty-two
percent of Munisport and fifty percent of ABC, who exercised day-to-day
operational and financial responsibility over the controlled corporation that
had committed the CERCLA violation.178 The court stressed the authority
of the officer-shareholders to control the management as well as the actual
control that they exercised over the operations.179  However, the court
refused to impose liability on a third shareholder-officer who held fifteen-
percent ownership but had no active management responsibilities."0
In these cases, it was not shown that the active (or less active) parties
sharing control had notice or knowledge of any statutory violation.
Accordingly, the courts did not have to consider whether possession of the
power to stop the violation could serve as the basis for imposition of liability.
United States v. McGraw involved a corporate joint venture in which the
shares were divided with fifty-one percent held by one shareholder and forty-
nine percent held by another shareholder.' The fifty-one-percent share-
holder having settled the litigation, the issue before the court was the
CERCLA liability of the forty-nine-percent shareholder, which was a
corporation.8 2 The corporation holding forty-nine percent of the shares
provided technical expertise, and one of its officers served as an officer of
the subsidiary.8 3 The court found that even these circumstances were
172. Id. at *6-8.
173. Id. at *5.
174. Id. at *6.
175. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 841.
176. Id. at 844.
177. Id.
178. Berger, 828 F. Supp. at 404, 410-11. Accord United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 866
F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
179. Berger, 828 F. Supp. at 410-11.
180. Id. at 411.
181. 718 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
182. Id. at 154-55.
183. Id. at 157.
1996]
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
sufficient to defeat the shareholder's motion for summary judgment.'8
With active involvement in management as the critical factor, liability
readily arises under shared control where any of the parties sharing control
is so engaged. Thus, in John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held both a parent and its subsidiary indepen-
dently accountable as owner and as operator, respectively, for the same
activities. I"5 By the same token, any party that only participates in the
exercise of control for purposes of the election of the board of directors of
the corporation at issue remains remote from operation.
In summary, the CERCLA decisions ready to apply enterprise principles
other than piercing the veil to impose CERCLA liability through "broad"
construction of the statutory terms agree that shared control neither defeats
the imposition of enterprise liability nor automatically results in liability.
They look to the degree of involvement of the party sharing control in the
management of the affairs of the controlled corporation. This is the very
standard employed by such courts in determining the application of enterprise
principles to impose CERCLA liability on parent corporations (and other
controlling shareholders) possessing sole control.' Where the requisite
degree of operational involvement has been established, it is apparently
irrelevant whether the party exercising it has sole control or is sharing
control.
3. Other Statutes
Under the statutes of general application other than the environmental
laws, control plays a central role in determining the imposition of statutory
liability on a parent corporation (or controlling shareholder) for statutory
violations of a subsidiary (or controlled corporation). As may be expected,
the existence and degree of exercise of control is the starting point for
analysis wherever the application of enterprise principles superseding
traditional entity law is under consideration in this context.
In contrast to the consideration of control and even shared control in
CERCLA matters, cases considering the imposition of enterprise principles
in the implementation of statutes of general application provide only limited
insight into the legal significance of shared control. In the handful of cases
involving shared control under such statutes, the courts, like the courts
imposing enterprise liability for CERCLA purposes, have disregarded the
184. Id. at 158.
185. 992 F.2d 401, 407-08 (lst Cir. 1993).
186. See BLUMBERO & STRASSER, GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 1, § 18.01-.07;
see also Kurt A. Strasser & Denise Rodosevich, Seeing the Forest for the Trees in CERCLA
Liability, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 493, 511-13 (1993).
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forms of separate juridical identity to impose liability only when the party
sharing control has been actively involved in the operational matters that
have given rise to the statutory violation.
IV. THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF STATUTORY REGULATORY PROGRAMS
In statutory programs supervised by administrative agencies, the agencies
have far-reaching powers in the determination of the precise contours of
control. In fact, some major statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, although using the term control,
did not define it; by design, the drafters of these statutes left its formulation
and reformulation to the rulemaking and case-by-case determination of the
regulatory agency."8 7 Even where a statute defines control in considerable
detail, as in the great holding company statutes, the administrative regulations
provide refinements of importance. Finally, in some areas such as the labor
laws and foreign trade laws, the statutes make no reference to control at all.
However, as a result of administrative construction of statutory terms such
as "employer" and "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"
respectively, the administrative agencies supervising statutory programs have
introduced far-reaching enterprise doctrines based on expansive definitions
of control.
In the accommodation of U.S. jurisprudence to the growing prominence
of administrative agencies in the extensive body of regulatory law enacted by
the Franklin D. Roosevelt and subsequent administrations, the Supreme Court
has greatly enhanced the role and influence of such agencies. Through
doctrines like the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which requires prior
submission of certain matters to agencies rather than to courts, the final order
doctrine, which bars appeal of interlocutory and interim orders, and the
requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court
substantially strengthened the scope of the role of agencies in the legal
system.
In Rochester Telephone Co. v. United States,' a decision of profound
importance, the Court further enhanced agency power by allocating to
administrative rulemaking and adjudication the near exclusive responsibility
for determining the role and meaning of control in delineating the outer
boundary of statutory liability in the area being administered.19 In
187. See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub. nom.
Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057, 1072 (1986), (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383-73, at
26 (1934)), cert. denied, Bankers Trust Co. v. Metge, 474 U.S. 1072 (1986).
188. 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
189. Id. at 145.
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Rochester, the Court gave control an expansive functional meaning, holding
that control was to be determined by a regard for "actualities ... [of]
intercorporate relation."' 9  In Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States,
the Court also has stated that control "encompass[ed] every type of control
in fact."' 91 However important, this was only a prelude. The Court went
on to uphold the leading role of administrative agencies in applying the
concept of control. 92 It held that control was "an issue of fact," and that
the agency's determination of control was conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record.' 93  The Court later characterized
Rochester as rejecting all "artificial tests of control."'" As stated by a
lower federal court, control is an issue for which the agency given its
expertise and experience is "uniquely qualified" to determine.' 95
Although the courts theoretically have the final authority to determine
whether an agency's regulations fall within its discretionary authority in light
of the statutory text and history, the reality is that with respect to the issue
of control, the courts have almost never interfered with administrative
rulemaking defining the extent of control. Further, in view of the breadth of
the Rochester doctrine, the courts have almost never overturned an
administrative adjudication of control.
This is a factor of crucial significance. The very wide area of discretion
available to administrative agencies, naturally ready to take a most expansive
view of the range of their authority, has inevitably meant the fullest
flowering of enterprise principles in U.S. jurisprudence. The cases involving
the role of control under statutory regulatory programs that involve agency
rulemaking and adjudication can be understood only against this background.
This contrasts sharply with other areas in which administrative agencies
have played a minor role or no role at all, and the courts have had the
decisive role in determining the construction and application of regulatory
statutes or disputes between private parties arising at common law. In these
areas, the courts have been more reluctant to introduce expansive concepts
of control that go beyond the accepted concepts of corporation law and the
narrow limits of piercing the veil.
190. Id. at 146.
191. 371 U.S. 115, 125 (1962).
192. Rochester, 307 U.S. at 138.
193. Id. at 145-46.
194. See Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151, 163, reh 'g denied, 353 U.S.
989 (1957).
195. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D. Del. 1969),
aff'd, 424 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1976).
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V. CONTROL IN COMMON LAW CONTROVERSIES
A. General Standards
In common law areas, U.S. courts have traditionally applied the concepts
of entity law. The concept of the juridical person with his or her own rights
and liabilities separate from those of any other juridical person has been the
foundation of the U.S. legal system as well as other Western legal sys-
tems. 96  The traditional safety valve, permitting disregard of juridical
identity, has been traditional piercing the veil jurisprudence. With occasional
exceptions,'97 piercing has typically provided the only route to disregard of
entity in common law controversies between private parties. 9 8 As noted,
traditional piercing requires, among other elements, an excessively intrusive
exercise of control by the controlling shareholders. In this area, control
means dominance over the affairs of the controlled corporation, not merely
the power to choose the majority of the board. Such "dominance" goes well
beyond the parent's determination of the general policies of a subsidiary or
the establishment of ceilings on a subsidiary's independent decisions on
matters such as budget or capital expenditures. Under the traditional
doctrine, such measures are typically of little or no legal consequence in the
consideration of the imposition of intragroup liability. The courts widely
accept such restraints as the conventional pattern in U.S. business.
The exercise of control must be so extensive as to impair the very core
of the managerial independence of the subsidiary and its decisionmaking
process. As one much quoted passage has put it: Piercing requires
"[c]ontrol, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete
196. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 3-8
(1993).
197. The railroad industry, until the decision in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155
N.E. 58 (1926), and the taxi industry to date are examples of such exceptions. See, e.g., Davis
v. Alexander, 269 U.S. 114, 117 (1925); Mull v. Colt, Co. 31 F.R.D. 154, 166-67 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 29 A.D.2d 763, 287 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div.), afl'd, 23
N.Y.2d 714, 244 N.E.2d 55 (1968) (The Court of Appeals of New York, in Walkovsky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8, 276 N.Y.S.2d, 585, 588-89 (1966), stated:
"[I]t is one thing to assert that a corporation is a fragment of a larger corporate combine which
actually conducts the business . . . [and which] would be held financially responsible.");
Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., Inc., 157 Misc. 627, 284 N.Y.S. 183, 187-88 (Sup. Ct.
1935), affid per curiam, 247 A.D. 853, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (3d Dep't 1936), leave to appeal
denied, 272 N.Y. 676 (1937); see also BLUMBERG, CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE
COMMON LAW, supra note 1, § 12 passim.
198. By contrast, where public policy concerns of magnitude are involved, the Supreme
Court has rejected the standards of piercing the veil as mechanical and artificial. See First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983)
(warning "against permitting worn epithets [such as piercing the veil jurisprudence] to
substitute for rigorous analysis").
19961
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business practices in
respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity had at the
time no separate mind, will or existence of its own."'" In such a setting,
shared control manifestly occupies a very different role than under the
statutory law.
The traditional doctrine appears to present less of a barrier in the case of
individual controlling shareholders sharing control of a controlled corporation
than in the case of large corporate groups. The reduced size, the greater
informality, and the personalized role of the individual shareholder contribute
in the aggregate to an atmosphere more conducive to intrusive participation
in the operations and management of the controlled corporation. Although
individual controlling shareholders who share control have often been
subjected to liability at common law by reason of their active, personal
involvement in the operations of the controlled corporation, individuals doing
no more than sharing control in the election of the board of directors and not
participating in operations have almost never been subjected to liability.
In the case of large corporate groups sharing control in a corporate joint
venture, the vastly increased size, the much greater formality of operations
and procedures, and the representative nature of the parent's designees
involved in subsidiary affairs establish a very different atmosphere, less
conducive to the "dominance" required under the traditional view. As will
be seen, there is little litigation in this area except for the silicone gel breast
implant litigations. These decisions, readily rejecting the imposition of
shareholder liability, throw no significant light on the degree of shareholder
involvement that would have been required for imposition of liability.
In certain common law areas, including jurisdiction, some areas of
procedure, and torts, U.S. law has seen the emergence of decisions rejecting
traditional concepts of piercing the veil and applying enterprise principles.
These courts have in effect looked pragmatically at the economic realities of
the common enterprise rather than applying the formalism of entity law, the
separate juridical identity of the related corporations, and formal indicia of
separate existence. They have done so where they have concluded that
enterprise principles rather than entity law more effectively implemented the
underlying objectives and policies of the law in the area.
As noted, the primary factors for such liability are: the extensive
exercise of control, even though less than the dominance required by the
traditional doctrine, and the economic and operational interrelationship of the
group affiliates, as shown by factors such as the economic integration of their
operations, their financial interdependence, their administrative interdepen-
199. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (lst
Dep't), af'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
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dence, the group integration of personnel assignments and benefits, and the
common conduct of group operations under a common- public persona.2
Nevertheless, this emergence of recognition of enterprise principles, however
pronounced, for most purposes still reflects only a minority view.
In proceeding in this manner, the courts have been typically concerned
with hierarchical corporate groups and accordingly, have not had occasion to
examine the role of shared control. In view of the emphasis on the
integration of the related corporations in the collective enterprise under
common control, the application of enterprise principles in the case of a
corporate joint venture with shared control requires a very different emphasis.
On this, the cases to date provide little guidance.
B. Shared Control
In the application of traditional concepts of piercing the veil in common
law controversies, cases involving several individual controlling shareholders
and a controlled corporation present a very different pattern from those
involving parent and subsidiary corporations. This appears to reflect the
substantial differences in size that typically exist between these two classes
of controlled corporations. Individually owned corporations in the United
States tend to be closely held and typically function on a much smaller scale
than parent and subsidiary corporations, which in many cases are very widely
held and operate on an incomparably large scale.
In the close, intimate setting of the individually controlled corporation,
shared control is a common place. The few shareholders frequently also are
officers and employees of the controlled business. The very smallness of the
undertaking encourages both informality of operations and actions by the
controlling shareholders that depart, sometimes grossly, from conventional
corporate formalities. Under such circumstances, decisions imposing liability
under traditional piercing doctrines on persons sharing control are numerous.
This tells us little, however, about the very different setting of the large
corporate group.
Shared control in corporate groups is uncommon. The parent corporation
typically is firmly in control, and for this purpose, it is entirely irrelevant
whether the parent maintains control through total or partial ownership of the
shares of its subsidiaries. One special area in U.S. law provides an
exception. Where one corporate group joins another in a joint venture
conducted by a jointly owned subsidiary, the issue of the significance of
shared control is squarely presented.
Corporate joint ventures are only one example of the newer types of
nonhierarchical structure in U.S. economic undertakings. Other developments
200. See BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 1, § 6 passim.
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include strategic alliances and corporate networks. All of these developments
are efforts to move outside the firm and join forces with a marketing,
distribution, or manufacturing partner in the conduct of a discrete part of
their respective enterprises.
Strategic alliances involve the establishment of a relationship in the form
of a license or supply contract pertaining to a particular stage of production
or distribution rather than the conduct of an overall business undertaking. As
such, a strategic alliance does not constitute a fully integrated enterprise that
may be deemed an "economic entity" on its own and thereby, contribute to
its recognition as a new form of legal entity.2"' Accordingly, strategic
alliances do not present the important issue of whether shared control of the
activities of the alliance may give rise to some form of enterprise liability.
Corporate networks refer to economic interrelationships resting on
extensive cross-ownership such as in the Japanese zaibatsu, keiretsu, and
kigyoshudan,2 "2 and the European holdings companies.2 3 By contrast,
such structures are uncommon in the United States. While the relatively
minor amounts of securities in these cross-holdings are sufficiently significant
to create some pressure for the corporate policies of the corporations involved
to be conducted in a congruent fashion with mutual awareness of each other's
objectives, typically they do not present the reality of shared control to the
degree required to give rise to the enterprise issues considered in this article.
In contrast to such forms of nonhierarchical relationships, corporate joint
ventures do present serious issues of the significance of shared control and
its implications for the application of enterprise principles.
VI. SHARED CONTROL AND CORPORATE JOINT VENTURES
In contrast to strategic alliances and corporate networks, corporate joint
ventures are an area in which problems of shared control have arisen in
connection with common law controversies involving large corporate
groups.2 4  A commercial joint venture is a collective undertaking by two
or more parties to conduct a business operation separate from their own
201. See RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, 6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE
MONITORING: THE WHYs AND Hows, AUST'L J. CoRP,. L. 309 (1996).
202. See Krasnow, supra note 10, at 56 (discussing the evolution of Japanese business
groups); see also SCOTT, supra note 10, at 291, 302.
203. Both corporate networks and so-called holdings companies that have made their
appearance on the European scene are virtually unknown in the United States. See Van Hulle,
supra note 9. Accordingly, they fall outside the scope of this article.
204. Another departure is the rapidly increasing phenomena of strategic alliances in which
two groups enter into a long-term interrelationship with respect to a discrete fragment of their
operation to satisfy common interests. Such alliances typically involve licenses or contracts.
They do not involve the common conduct of a separate enterprise and, accordingly, do not
represent a case of shared control of the activity in question.
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operations. Except in those cases where the joint ventures is conducted in
corporate form, such an undertaking for profit does not have its own juridical
identity. Instead, it is treated essentially as a partnership organized for a
limited time and purpose and is governed by analogy to partnership
principles."'
Where two participating parties conduct their collective undertaking in
the form of a corporation in which they own the shares, a so-called corporate
joint venture is involved.2" It is a jointly owned subsidiary corporation
with two parent corporations who share control. This is a significant
departure from the traditional monolithic hierarchical structure of the
multinational corporation, involving a pyramidal structure with a single
parent corporation exercising control through stock ownership, directly or
indirectly, of sufficient shares of the various subsidiaries to control the
election of their boards of directors.
The courts have uniformly refused to recognize corporate joint ventures
as "joint ventures," to be treated for legal purposes according to principles
developed for noncorporate joint ventures rather than as a corporation
governed by corporation law. Without exception, the courts have rejected
attempts to impose liability on shareholders sharing control in reliance on
joint venture law based on partnership principles drawn from cases involving
unincorporated joint ventures. They have concluded that corporation law
governs jointly owned corporations of such a nature just as much as other
corporations. Under the established view, "[t]he two forms of business are
mutually exclusive, each governed by a separate body of law."20 7  The
established doctrine has been most recently applied and liability rejected
against the controlling shareholders in a corporate joint venture in the
celebrated mass tort litigation over alleged product liability involving silicone
gel breast implants.20 8
The issue of shareholder liability for corporate joint venture obligations
that is based on shared control has arisen most dramatically in the litigation,
205. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., No. C-1313-
RLC, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1988); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Commodities Bagging & Shipping, Process Supply Co., 611 F. Supp. 665, 679 (D.N.J. 1985);
2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 318 (3d ed. 1959).
206. The term, "corporate joint venture" is, thus, self-contradictory; so long as this is kept
in mind, the term, nevertheless, is a useful means by which to identify the jointly owned
subsidiary of two corporate parents.
207. Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of Am., 3 N.Y.2d 444, 449, 144 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1957);
see In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ala. 1993)
[hereinafter Dow Corning], confirmed, 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 1995); Jackson
v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 599, 75 A. 568, 571 (1910).
208. Dow Corning, 837 F. Supp. at 1128.
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involving Dow Coming Corporation.2" This case involves the alleged
product liability of the manufacturers and distributors of a product developed
and manufactured by the Dow Coming Corporation (Dow Coming), a
corporate joint venture of the Dow Chemical Company (Dow) and Coming
Fiberglas Corporation (Coming).210
Dow and Coming organized Dow Corning fifty years ago to conduct a
business involving the manufacture and sale of silicone products, combining
Dow's chemical processing and manufacturing expertise and Coming's
silicone technology.2 ' They divided the shares of Dow Coming equally
between them.2  Over the years, Dow Coming became one of the 500
largest U.S. corporations with several billion dollars of gross assets.21 3 It
operated its own plants in seven states and nine countries with its own
employees.214
Thousands of lawsuits have now been filed against Dow Coming, its two
parents - Dow and Coming - and others by persons alleging to have been
injured by Dow Coming silicone breast implants. 5 There are potential
claims by thousands of other persons not yet filed. 6 This represents one
of the most massive tort liability litigations in the history of U.S. law. Most
cases in the federal courts have been consolidated and are being heard in a
single proceeding in the federal district court in Alabama. 7 Other cases
have gone to judgment before a federal district court in Illinois.
In the Alabama proceeding, motions by Dow and Coming for judgment
on the pleadings or for summary judgment sharply presented the issue of
whether the two parents could be liable for the torts allegedly committed by
their jointly owned subsidiary.2 9  The plaintiffs relied on traditional
concepts of piercing the veil and a new view of joint venture law. 220 The
court rejected their contentions and granted the defendants' motion.22  As
noted in the preceding section, the court sharply rejected the contention that
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1130.





216. Id. at 1130.
217. Id.
218. In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 880 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1995).
219. Dow Corning, 837 F. Supp. at 1130-31.
220. Id. at 1132 & n.5.
221. Id. at 1142-43. The court subsequently confirmed and certified its order as a final
judgment in favor of Coming but vacated its order insofar as it related to the plaintiffs' direct
liability claims against Dow. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F.
Supp. 1455, 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
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the legal relationships of a corporate joint venture such as Dow Coming were
to be determined by partnership concepts resting on its joint venture
aspects.2  The court regarded the problem of corporate joint ventures to
be governed by traditional corporation doctrines 223 and accordingly,
analyzed the problem by application of the concepts of piercing the corporate
veil.224
The court noted numerous strong links between Dow and Coming and
their jointly owned subsidiary in addition to the fifty percent stock ownership
of each.225 Among other things, the court found that Dow and Coming
directors, officers, and current or former employees had comprised all the
directors of Dow Coming in early years, and that thereafter Dow and
Coming directors or officers comprised a majority of the Dow Coming board
of directors.226 The two corporate parent corporations provided substantial
financial support to Dow Coming including short term loans, guaranties of
Dow Coming debt, and purchase of Dow Coming long-term debt.227 Dow
and Coming allowed Dow Coming to utilize their facilities and personnel to
conduct silicone-related research for which Dow Coming reimbursed the
parents for their expense.228 There was significant personnel integration
with parent stock utilized in the Dow Coming stock option and purchase
plans and the transfer of some personnel. 229 Dow listed Dow Coming as
a coinsured on Dow's excess liability insurance policy issued by Dow's
captive insurance company.
230
Notwithstanding this close interrelationship between the affiliated
companies, the court concluded that it did not support "an inference of
excessive or otherwise improper involvement" by the parent corporations in
Dow Coming affairs.231' The court further found that the subsidiary had
complied with all corporate formalities, and by conducting large-scale
operations of its own, had all the indicia of separate corporate existence. It
held that the facts "clearly demonstrate a separate corporate existence for
Dow Coming, recognized and respected by it and its parent corpora-
tions. 232
222. Dow Coming, 837 F. Supp. at 1139.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1133-38.
225. Id. at 1138-39.
226. Id. at 1135.
227. Id. at 1136-37.
228. Id. at 1135.
229. Id. at 1135-36.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1134.
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Noting that Dow Coming had retained fifty-six percent of its earnings in
the last ten years, had doubled its working capital, and had trebled its total
assets and shareholder equity during this period, the court rejected the
allegation that Dow Coming had been undercapitalized.233
Finally, the court held that there had been no showing of any kind of
inequitable or unfair behavior.234 Dow Coming had not been incorporated
in an effort to escape liability; there was no intermingling of funds, improper
loans, or asset draining. Under all the circumstances, the court held that the
requirements of piercing the veil for purposes of imposing tort liability on
either Dow Chemical or on Coming had not been satisfied.23 However,
it did hold that the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of Dow
Chemical's direct liability for its own negligence to defeat the latter's motion
for summary judgment.236
In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation237 was the Illinois
litigation involving silicone gel product liability claims against Dow and
Coming for breast implants manufactured by Dow Coming.238 Following
the decision in Dow Corning, the court granted the summary judgment
motions of Dow and Coming on the plaintiffs' joint venture and piercing the
veil claims. 2
39
Since the courts in these two cases did not find the exercise of control
so excessive as to satisfy piercing standards, they never had the occasion to
consider the special problems presented by shared control. In its review of
the facts, however, the Alabama court appeared to be focusing separately on
the conduct of each parent in determining whether its own exercise of control
was "excessive." The Alabama court was not concerned about the fact that
each parent shared control with the other. It does not appear that this factor
would have presented an obstacle to the imposition of liability if the court
had concluded that one of the parents had exercised control to an impermissi-
ble degree.
VII. CONCLUSION
Shared control must be analyzed as a subset of control, and its signifi-
cance primarily determined by the significance of the role of control in the
area of the law in question and the particular context involved. United States
law appears to treat the possession or exercise of shared control by one of the
233. Id. at 1137.
234. Id. at 1138.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1133.
237. 880 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1995).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1322.
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parties sharing control very much as it responds to a comparable manifesta-
tion of control by the party with sole control. The crucial element is the
nature of the actual manifestation of control in light of the significance of
control in the area of the law at issue.
Where, as in the statutes of specific application, a crucial factor for
determining statutory application is control over the election of the board of
directors, participation by a principal shareholder as a member of the control
group in a concerted action to control the election of the board of directors,
although representing shared control, does not present a different problem
than control. In either case, statutory liability follows.
In statutes of general application, and even more plainly in common law
controversies involving private individuals, control of the election of the
directors is not sufficient in itself for imposition of shareholder liability.
Accordingly, in this area, the imposition of shareholder liability on a party
with shared control must, as in the case of a party in sole control, rest on the
manner in which the party exercises it. As noted, this means that the party
must participate in the exercise of control over operational and other
managerial matters in a manner comparable to parties with sole control who
have been subjected to enterprise liability in this area.
In some statutes of general application, such as CERCLA, this test for
liability may require direct personal involvement in the operations of the
controlled corporation giving rise to liability. In other statutes or in
common-law controversies, other factors such as economic integration,
financial and administrative interdependence, enterprise conduct of personnel
matters, and conduct of business under a common business persona appear
to be required in addition to an excessive exercise of control. Where such
factors are indeed required, the operational circumstances of the enterprise
appear highly unlikely to present these interrelationships for the party sharing
control, except in some cases of corporate joint ventures. Accordingly,
imposition of liability on those with shared control in these areas is unlikely.
In sum, shared control appears to give rise to serious prospect for
enterprise liability only in a limited area. It would appear necessary either
that control play a decisive or near decisive role in the implementation of
enterprise principles in the area as frequently occurs in statutes of specific
application or that the party sharing control has actively participated in the
aspect of the operations of the controlled corporation giving rise to the
statutory violation.
Corporate joint ventures may differ from other forms of shared control
and present a more serious case for imposition of enterprise liability.
However, aside from the Dow Corning litigation, there is little guidance
available on whether the enterprise principles applied to date by some courts
in the case of hierarchical corporate groups may be adapted to serve as a
basis for liability when control has been shared in corporate joint venture
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form. The Dow Corning decisions have firmly applied traditional concepts
and have refused to do so. Thus, although the prospects for further legal
changes in the area appear limited, it is still too early to conclude that U.S.
courts have provided a final answer.
